Category Archives: Vault7

Quick Reference Resource Introduction: WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 Leaks

This series covers links to and analysis of each of the WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 leaks including:

  1. The WikiLeaks pages;
  2. The associated CIA documents – Specification Documents, Systems Requirements, Installation Guides, User Guides, User Manuals, Test Plans, Tactics Documents, Slides and so on;
  3. Links to a “splash” analysis of each leak on The Hacker News;
  4. Analysis by other third party publications of each leak;
  5. General comments, notes, and links added by AirGap Anonymity Collective as each leak and its previous deployment is more clearly understood;
  6. Analysis and examples of the subsequent use and deployment of theses hacking tools by cyber criminals, cyber terrorists, state actors, hackers, and others;

These documents are marked with various security classifications. To understand what these classifications mean see Understanding NSA / INR Security Classifications on Intelligence Assessments;

Posts in this series to date:

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #14 – OutlawCountry;

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #16 – HighRise;

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #15 – BothanSpy & Gyrfalcon;

All third party content is explicitly acknowledged and content or imagery that has been altered or amended for ease of use is clearly marked.  

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Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #14 – OutlawCountry

The OutlawCountry Linux hacking tool consists of a kernel module, which the CIA hackers load via shell access to the targeted system and create a hidden Netfilter table with an obscure name on a target Linux user. The OutlawCountry project allows the CIA hackers to redirect all outbound network traffic on the targeted computer to CIA controlled computer systems for exfiltrate and infiltrate data. *

Although the installation and persistence method of the OutlawCountry tool is not described in detail in the document, it seems like the CIA hackers rely on the available CIA exploits and backdoors to inject the kernel module into a targeted Linux operating system. However, there are some limitations to using the tool, such as the kernel modules only work with compatible Linux kernels. **

The 30th June 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

“Today, June 30th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the OutlawCountry project of the CIA that targets computers running the Linux operating system. OutlawCountry allows for the redirection of all outbound network traffic on the target computer to CIA controlled machines for ex- and infiltration purposes. The malware consists of a kernel module that creates a hidden netfilter table on a Linux target; with knowledge of the table name, an operator can create rules that take precedence over existing netfilter/iptables rules and are concealed from an user or even system administrator. The installation and persistence method of the malware is not described in detail in the document; an operator will have to rely on the available CIA exploits and backdoors to inject the kernel module into a target operating system. OutlawCountry v1.0 contains one kernel module for 64-bit CentOS/RHEL 6.x; this module will only work with default kernels. Also, OutlawCountry v1.0 only supports adding covert DNAT rules to the PREROUTING chain.

Two documents were also published alongside this release:

OutlawCountry v1.0 User Manual

OutlawCountry v1.0 Test Plan

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks dumps #1 – #13 and #15 – #17 synopses are available on WikiLeaks and analysis of OutlawCountry at The Hacker News.

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Edited Image courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews

* Content courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews

** Content courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews

Building A Global Nation State SMB Exploit Honeypot Infrastructure With A £50 Budget #EternalPot

Note to post: All words, IP ownership, analysis, opinions, data, graphs et al are the property of Kevin Beaumont and where altered and extracted are done so remaining true to the original meaning / assertions. From and article by “Kevin Beaumont InfoSec, from the trenches of reality. Email kevin.beaumont@gmail.com | Twitter: @gossithedog on Twitter” titled “EternalPot — Lessons from building a global Nation State SMB exploit honeypot infrastructure” athttps://doublepulsar.com/eternalpot-lessons-from-building-a-global-nation-state-smb-exploit-honeypot-infrastructure-3f2a0b064ffe

Worthy of note before beginning to read this beauty – Mr. Beaumont predicted that this would happen back in April 2017:

Now over to the expert ….

Extracts BEGIN (again full original article here

A week ago I started building #EternalPot, a honeypot for the Equation Group SMB exploits leaked by the Shadow Brokers last month.” (May 2017) – “My entire budget for one of this is £50, as I self fund all my InfoSec research — I work for a company that makes crab paste, so everything is done outside of work, on my own time. I highly recommend working InfoSec for a company where the CapEx tap is turned off temporarily, by the way, as you’ll find out how skilled your workforce are and you’ll get back to the most important part of InfoSec: the basics. Build simple solutions, always…..

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There has been a lot of vendor and press coverage of WannaCry which has been inaccurate. Despite what has been said, WannaCry was not spread via phishing or email — in fact, it was an SMB worm. Seeing a constant stream of misinformation from InfoSec vendors still around this has been depressing — it still continues to this day, long since the major players and initial victims walked back the email line…..

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The EternalPot data has shown advanced attacks, multiple coin miners, remote access trojans and lateral movement attempts into corporate networks — all via the Windows SMBv1 service. One of the exploits — EternalBlue — was used by the WannaCry ransomware spreader…..

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As you can see pre-WannaCry (refer to diagram in article and below), these SMB attacks were almost non-existent. It’s an SMB worm like the ones from the prior decade. Another angle to the press coverage was Windows XP being impacted — in fact, an entire weekend of UK mainstream media and political commentary ran about this. While SMBv1 has serious issues on Windows XP and 2003 (and on later OSes!) and should be patched and firewalled (aka disabled), the reality was the WannaCry spreader didn’t work on Windows XP SP3…..

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All the WannaCry samples seen so far — thousands delivered in real world honeypots — have two factors:

  1. They are one of two corrupt versions, where they spread but fail to execute ransomware as the PE headers are corrupt.
  2. They contain working killswitches.

If you’re pondering why WannaCry seemed to disappear almost completely, here we are. The authors simply disappeared. The Tor payment pages don’t even exist now. We owe MalwareTech more than pizza…..

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Another angle to the press coverage was Windows XP being impacted — in fact, an entire weekend of UK mainstream media and political commentary ran about this. While SMBv1 has serious issues on Windows XP and 2003 (and on later OSes!) and should be patched and firewalled (aka disabled), the reality was the WannaCry spreader didn’t work on Windows XP SP3. Here’s Kaspersky’s graph of infected operating systems…..

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One thing I will say — I don’t want to name the vendors, but some of the biggest next-generation security productssimply aren’t detecting SMB attacks nearly well enough. Malware regularly infects these systems, and they have to be reimaged as a result. It is amazing seeing next gen, premium tools with machine learning etc running Coin Miners andremote access trojans delivered via old exploits, with the tools not even noticing. It has been very eye opening for me. The marketing to reality Venn diagram here isn’t so Venn. At times it is so bad it is actually jaw dropping seeing certain attacks not being detected…..

Extracts END (again full original article here

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Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #15 – BothanSpy & Gyrfalcon

BothanSpy is Microsoft Windows implant that targets the SSH client program Xshell and steals user credentials for all active SSH sessions. Gyrfalcon is a CentOS, Debian, RHEL, SUSE, and Ubuntu Linux Platform implant that targets the OpenSSH client not only steals user credentials of active SSH sessions but is also capable of collecting full or partial OpenSSH session traffic. Both implants save the collected information in an encrypted file for later exfiltration while the BothanSpy implant also implements exfiltration in real time to a CIA server thus leaving no footprint on the target system storage disk(s).

The 6th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

“Today, July 6th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the BothanSpy and Gyrfalcon projects of the CIA. The implants described in both projects are designed to intercept and exfiltrate SSH credentials but work on different operating systems with different attack vectors. BothanSpy is an implant that targets the SSH client program Xshell on the Microsoft Windows platform and steals user credentials for all active SSH sessions. These credentials are either username and password in case of password-authenticated SSH sessions or username, filename of private SSH key and key password if public key authentication is used. BothanSpy can exfiltrate the stolen credentials to a CIA-controlled server (so the implant never touches the disk on the target system) or save it in an enrypted [sic] file for later exfiltration by other means. BothanSpy is installed as a Shellterm 3.x extension on the target machine. Gyrfalcon is an implant that targets the OpenSSH client on Linux platforms (centos,debian,rhel,suse,ubuntu). The implant can not only steal user credentials of active SSH sessions, but is also capable of collecting full or partial OpenSSH session traffic. All collected information is stored in an encrypted file for later exfiltration. It is installed and configured by using a CIA-developed root kit (JQC/KitV) on the target machine.

There documents were also published alongside this release BothanSpy V1.0 Tool Documentation, Gyrfalcon V2.0 User’s Guide, and Gyrfalcon 1.0 User Manual.

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks dumps #1 – #14 and #16 synopses are available on WikiLeaks and analysis of BothanSpy & Gyrfalcon at The Hacker News.

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Edited Image courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews – Original Image edited to add extract from BothanSpy Tool Documentation Page 8 Screenshot 07/16/2017.

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #16 – HighRise

HighRise is an android (V4.0 to V4.3) implant for SMS redirect to listening posts.

The 13th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

“Today, July 13th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the HighRise project of the CIA. HighRise is an Android application designed for mobile devices running Android 4.0 to 4.3. It provides a redirector function for SMS messaging that could be used by a number of IOC tools that use SMS messages for communication between implants and listening posts. HighRise acts as a SMS proxy that provides greater separation between devices in the field (“targets”) and the listening post (LP) by proxying “incoming” and “outgoing” SMS messages to an internet LP. HighRise provides a communications channel between the HighRise field operator and the LP with a TLS/SSL secured internet communication.”

A HighRise User’s Guide was also published.

Previous Vault 7 WikiLeaks dumps #1 – #15 synopses are available on WikiLeaks and analysis of HighRise at The Hacker News.

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Image courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews

Related Posts: #WikiLeaks #Vault7 Leak #16: #HighRise, #android implant for #SMS redirect #LP @TheHackersNews

https://airgapanonymitycollective.com/2017/07/15/wikileaks-cia-vault7-leak-16-highrise/