Category Archives: Mass Surveillance

Using Stylometry DHS have id’d Bitcoin creator Nakamoto with help from NSA PRISM & MUSCULAR programs

Allegedly using word surveillance and stylometry the effort took less than a month. Apparently using encryption and complex obfuscation methods is not a defence when the “seeker” has access to trillions of writing samples from a billion or so people across the globe.

By taking Satoshi’s texts and finding the 50 most common words, the NSA was able to break down his text into 5,000 word chunks and analyse each to find the frequency of those 50 words. This would result in a unique 50-number identifier for each chunk. The NSA then placed each of these numbers into a 50-dimensional space and flatten them into a plane using principal components analysis. The result is a ‘fingerprint’ for anything written by Satoshi that could easily be compared to any other writing.

It is worth noting that the original post is littered with comments that request more details on the source of the information that informed the post or some other such proof of the veracity of the claims being made but the author declared in response:

Many readers have asked that I provide third party citations to ‘prove’ the NSA identified Satoshi using stylometry. Unfortunately, I cannot as I haven’t read this anywhere else — hence the reason I wrote this post. I’m not trying to convince the reader of anything, instead my goal is to share the information I received and make the reader aware of the possibility that the NSA can easily determine the authorship of any email through the use of their various sources, methods, and resources.

Many readers have asked who Satoshi is and I’ve made it clear that information wasn’t shared with me. Based on my conversation I got the impression (never confirmed) that he might have been more than one person. This made me think that perhaps the Obama administration was right that Bitcoin was created by a state actor. One person commented on this post that Satoshi was actually four people. Again, I have no idea.

If it is true then “The moral of the story? You can’t hide on the internet anymore. Your sentence structure and word use is MORE unique than your own fingerprint. If an organization, like the NSA, wants to find you [sic] they will.

Full story by Alexander Muse is on Medium.

ENDS

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #20 – CouchPotato

CouchPotato enabled CIA agents to remotely use the tool to stealthily collect RTSP/H.264 video streams (RTSP/H.264: Real Time Streaming Protocol is a network control protocol designed for use in entertainment and communication systems and is a control mechanism for streaming media servers).

The tool provided CIA operatives with a number of options:

  • Collect the media stream as a video file (AVI);
  • Capture still images (JPG) of frames from the media stream;
    • This function was capable of being triggered only when there was change (threshold setting) in the pixel count from the previous capture;

The tool uses FFmpeg to encode and decode video and images and Real Time Streaming Protocol connectivity. The CouchPotato tool works stealthily without leaving any evidence on the attacked systems facilitated by ICE v3 “Fire and Collect” loader.

This is an in-memory code execution (ICE) technique that runs malicious code without the module code being written to the disk.

Neither Wikileaks, nor the leaked user guide explains how the agency penetrates the attacked systems, but as many CIA malware, exploits and hacking tools have already leaked in the Vault 7 publications, the agency has probably used CouchPotato in combination with other tools.” – TAD Group

The 10th August 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

“Today, August 10th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes the the User Guide for the CoachPotato project of the CIA. CouchPotato is a remote tool for collection against RTSP/H.264 video streams. It provides the ability to collect either the stream as a video file (AVI) or capture still images (JPG) of frames from the stream that are of significant change from a previously captured frame. It utilizes ffmpeg for video and image encoding and decoding as well as RTSP connectivity. CouchPotato relies on being launched in an ICE v3 Fire and Collect compatible loader.”

One document was published alongside this release:

CouchPotato v1.0 — User Guide

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks CIA document dump synopses are available via the Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 Leaks

ENDS 

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #18 – UCL / Raytheon

In November 2014, Raytheon announced its acquisition of Blackbird Technologies. This acquisition expanded Raytheon’s special operations capabilities in several areas including:

  • Tactical Intelligence
  • Surveillance and reconnaissance
  • Secure tactical communications
  • Cybersecurity

Raytheon stated that their existing capabilities were now augmented by the Blackbird Technologies acquisition “across a broad spectrum of globally dispersed platforms and communications networks”. Blackbird Technologies was synergistic with Raytheon’s existing expertise and capabilities specifically in the areas of:

  • Sensors
  • Communications
  • Command & Control

This document dump contains suggested PoC’s for malware attack vectors. Raytheon Blackbird Technologies acted as a “kind of “technology scout” for the Remote Development Branch (RDB) of the CIA”.

They analysed malware attacks in the public domain and then gave the CIA recommendations for malware projects. These suggestions by RBT to the CIA were in line with the agencies stated objectives. These malware recommendations benefitted from data derived from “test deployments” in the field by other malware actors. Weaknesses in legacy deployments were assessed and designed out in the CIA versions.

The 19th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

Today, July 19th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the CIA contractor Raytheon Blackbird Technologies for the “UMBRAGE Component Library” (UCL) project. The documents were submitted to the CIA between November 21st, 2014 (just two weeks after Raytheon acquired Blackbird Technologies to build a Cyber Powerhouse) and September 11th, 2015. They mostly contain Proof-of-Concept ideas and assessments for malware attack vectors – partly based on public documents from security researchers and private enterprises in the computer security field. Raytheon Blackbird Technologies acted as a kind of “technology scout” for the Remote Development Branch (RDB) of the CIA by analysing malware attacks in the wild and giving recommendations to the CIA development teams for further investigation and PoC development for their own malware projects.

Forty One (41) documents accompanied this release:

  1. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15083 — HTTPBrowser
  2. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15085 — NfLog
  3. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — Regin – Stealthy Surveillance
  4. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) FireEye — HammerToss – Stealthy Tactics
  5. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) VB — Gamker
  6. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) SentinelOne – Rombertik
  7. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) FireEye – Window into Russian Cyber Ops
  8. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) MalwareBytes — HanJuan Drops New Tinba
  9. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) Cisco — Rombertik
  10. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) RSA — Terracotta VPN
  11. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) Dell SecureWorks — Sakula
  12. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15078 — Skipper Implant
  13. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — Evolution of Ransomware
  14. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15079 — Cozy Bear
  15. 28 August, 2015 (U) McAfee DLL Hijack — PoC Report
  16. 28 August, 2015 (U) HeapDestroy – DLL Rootkit — PoC Report
  17. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) TW — WildNeutron
  18. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) NMehta — Theories on Persistence
  19. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) CERT-EU — Kerberos Golden Ticket
  20. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) VB Dridex 2015 — Dridex
  21. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — Black Vine
  22. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIR 15005 — Stalker Panda
  23. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15016 — Elirks RAT
  24. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) Eset — Liberpy
  25. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) Eset — Potao
  26. 7 August, 2015 (U) Sinowal Web Form Scraping — PoC Report
  27. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) MIRcon — Something About WMI
  28. 7 August, 2015 (U) PoC Report — Anti-Debugging and Anti-Emulation
  29. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) SY 2015 — Butterfly Attackers
  30. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — ZeroAccess Indepth
  31. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) CI 2015 — PlugX 7.0
  32. 7 August, 2015 (U) Mimikatz Password Scanning Analysis — PoC Report
  33. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) TrendMicro — Understanding WMI Malware
  34. 4 August, 2015 (S//NF) CanSecWest 2013 — DEP/ASLR Bypass Without ROP/JIT
  35. 26 June, 2015 (U) Software Restriction Policy: A/V Disable — PoC Report
  36. 26 June, 2015 (U) WMI Persistence Proof of Concept — Supplemental Report
  37. 29 May, 2015 (U) Mimikatz PoC Report
  38. 29 May, 2015 (U) Pony / Fareit PoC Report
  39. 26 January, 2015 (U) SIRIUS Pique Proof-of-Concept Delivery — User-Mode DKOM — Final PoC Report
  40. 29 December, 2014 (U) SIRIUS Pique Proof-of-Concept Delivery — Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) — Interim PoC Report
  41. 21 November, 2014 (U) Direct Kernel Object Manipulasiton (DKOM) — Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Outline 21 November, 2014

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks CIA document dump synopses are available via the Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 Leaks

ENDS 

 

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #19 – Dumbo

Dumbo is a capability to suspend processes utilizing webcams and corrupt any video recordings that could compromise a PAG deployment. The PAG (Physical Access Group) is a special branch within the CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence); its task is to gain and exploit physical access to target computers in CIA field operations. *

Vault7 Projects - Images - AAC Dumbo - PAG

The 3rd August 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

Today, August 3rd 2017 WikiLeaks publishes documents from the Dumbo project of the CIA. Dumbo is a capability to suspend processes utilizing webcams and corrupt any video recordings that could compromise a PAG deployment. The PAG (Physical Access Group) is a special branch within the CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence); its task is to gain and exploit physical access to target computers in CIA field operations. Dumbo can identify, control and manipulate monitoring and detection systems on a target computer running the Microsoft Windows operating sytem. It identifies installed devices like webcams and microphones, either locally or connected by wireless (Bluetooth, WiFi) or wired networks. All processes related to the detected devices (usually recording, monitoring or detection of video/audio/network streams) are also identified and can be stopped by the operator. By deleting or manipulating recordings the operator is aided in creating fake or destroying actual evidence of the intrusion operation. Dumbo is run by the field agent directly from an USB stick; it requires administrator privileges to perform its task. It supports 32bit Windows XP, Windows Vista, and newer versions of Windows operating system. 64bit Windows XP, or Windows versions prior to XP are not supported.

Log Excerpt:

Vault7 Projects - Images - AAC Dumbo - LOG

Eight documents were also published alongside this release:

Dumbo v3.0 — Field Guide

Dumbo v3.0 — User Guide

Dumbo v2.0 — Field Guide

Dumbo v2.0 — User Guide

Dumbo v1.0 — TDR Briefing

Dumbo v1.0 — User Guide

Dumbo Epione v1.0 — TDR Briefing

Dumbo Epione v1.0 — User Guide

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks CIA document dump synopses are available via the Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 Leaks

ENDS 

Boiling Privacy Frogs

I really wish that I understood more about psychology and the human condition. The behaviour that puzzles me over and over again and for which I have no explanation is our ability to observe something happening that is detrimental to us in every way and yet do nothing.

It is the “Boiling Frog Phenomenon” which was allegedly a 19th century science experiment where a frog was placed in a pan of boiling water, the frog quickly jumped out. However, when the frog was put in cold water and the water slowly boiled over time, the frog did not perceive the danger and just boiled to death. The hypothesis being that the change in temperature was so gradual that the frog did not realize it was boiling to death.

To demonstrate the same effect in terms of the privacy, surveillance, unwarranted government intrusion debate just trace the evolving public attitude to the J. Edgar Hoover’s Subversive Files, COINTELPRO, The Iraq WMD Lie, Snowden & PRISM, and WikiLeaks Vault 7.

I have come to the conclusion that in relation to our right to privacy that we are all frogs in tepid water, the temperature of which is starting to rise rapidly, and we have no intention of jumping out.

ENDS

The Laurel & Hardy of Cybersecurity

When Turnbull and Brandis shuffle off to some home for the bewildered in a few years it is all of us that will be left with the legacy of their carry-on.

Here are some of the victories that these two beauties have presided over, and they don’t even know how it works, not even a little bit:

In an effort to drag the continent out from under the “stupid boy” stereotype, the Lowy Institute for International Policy, has just attempted to polish a turd by proposing that despite everything “Australia might be on the right encryption-cracking track” after all.

“From a cyber security perspective, as Patrick Gray has pointed out, sufficient safeguards could be placed around these ‘updates’ to ensure that they couldn’t be reverse engineered – they wouldn’t need to be a ‘backdoor,’ open to abuse. And by focusing on a device rather than a specific app, the displacement effect, so obvious in focusing government efforts on just What’s App or Telegram, would not apply.

In theory then, this model appears promising. How closely it aligns with the legislation promised by Turnbull and George Brandis last week remains to be seen. But whichever legislative model Australia pursues, its progress will be watched closely by governments across the world. And of course, by a whole host of technology and communications companies.

Recent developments suggest that underneath the techno-babble, political point scoring and counter-terrorism blame game, governments the world over are faced by a very real policy problem. Australia may prove to be the test case for a policy solution that has far reaching consequences for privacy, technological development and the future of law enforcement operations.”

Try again gents.

ENDS

So, So Reasonable, The Politics of Fear – Retrofitting Abnormality

I have read many, many reasonable articles about the need for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to have the ability to access the communications of person’s of interest.

Patrick Gray recently wrote in “No encryption was harmed in the making of this intercept” that:

“Over the last few days people have been losing their minds over an announcement by the Australian government that it will soon introduce laws to compel technology companies to hand over the communications of their users. This has largely been portrayed as some sort of anti-encryption push, but that’s not my take. At all. Before we look at the government’s proposed “solution,” it might make sense to define some problems, as far as law enforcement and intelligence agencies are concerned. The first problem has very little to do with end-to-end encryption and a lot more to do with access to messaging metadata.”

he continues …

“Thanks to our pal Phineas Fisher, we’ve had a glimpse into the sausage factory that is the law enforcement trojanware industry. Gamma Group and Hacking Team, two companies that make surveillance software for mobile phones, were both hacked by Mr. Fisher and the gory details of their operations laid bare. What we learned is that law enforcement organisations already have perfectly functional trojans that they can install on a target’s phone. These trojans canalready intercept communications from encrypted apps.”

and then …

“Do we believe that law enforcement bodies should have the authority to monitor the communications of people suspected of serious criminal offences? If so, what should the legal process for provisioning that access look like? I mentioned auditing access under this scheme a couple of paragraphs ago. If we’re going to have a regime like this, can we have a decent access auditing scheme please? These are the sorts of things I would prefer to be talking about.”

Think about everything that is happening at the moment in terms of the erosion of your privacy, free speech, and civil liberties. And then ask yourself the following:

  1. Do I think that politicians are concerned with striking an appropriate balance between the right to privacyfreedom of speech, and the preservation of civil liberties with the need to maintain the rule of law;
  2. Do I think that the current wave of proposed surveillance legislation is an attempt to normalise abnormal and illegal  practices by our governments and intelligence agencies, now that they have been exposed;
  3. Do I think that all of this proposed legislation is engineered to save our governments and intelligence agencies the bother of the endless crisis room PR;
  4. Do I think that our governments and intelligence agencies are tired of having to react to the publication of their illegal practices by whistleblowers;
  5. Do I think instead that they wish to fob off all objections to Mass Surveillance with a dismissive “we’ve heard it all before” hand wave, the benefit of a statute, while mumbling “imminent threat”, “terrorists”, “pedophiles”, “dark markets”;

ENDS