Category Archives: Surveillance Programs

Gangsters with Blackberry’s & the Upsurge in “Intelligence Led” Busts

A sensational story about the criminal use of encryption appeared across social media this week like it was a scoop. It wasn’t. But that’s the way it was portrayed.

For the uninformed it played directly into the narrative that encryption is bad and overwhelmingly used by those withquestionable motives or downright evil intentions.

So What Happened?

The headlines varied but basically Vincent Ramos the boss of Phantom Secure, a company whose website declares that it supplies “THE WORLDS MOST TRUSTED COMMUNICATION SERVICE” was arrested in California.

The company supplies or supplied a modded and allegedly zero knowledge handset which is or was it claimed “Simple, effective and easy to use while highly secure, … recognized by government agencies and cyber experts as “Uncrackable” “.

All utter rubbish of course but if you are selling a high performance sports car to a guy who struggles with a gear change on a bicycle then who is to contradict you?

Imagine! Organised crime were using encrypted phones to communicate and those encrypted phones were being supplied by commercial outfits who knew.

Scoop? No.

“Buyer Beware” — What Did Phantom Secure Sell?

Phantom

The sales bumf declared that the “Classic Phantom Secure Encrypted BlackBerry Device”, apparently proven “year after year”, (by whom is unstated) was light weight and easy to use and provided end to end encrypted messaging, in theory. The package included:

  1. Modified and Locked Down Device
  2. Secure Encrypted Device to Device Encrypted Messaging
  3. Anonymous Communication
  4. International Roaming
  5. 6 months Subscription Included

The “Phantom Secure Android Edition” made the laughable statement that it provided unmatched secure enterprise mobility from BlackBerry and the “best at rest” security on an Android KNOX device, which communicated over the Phantom Secure service.

Summarising, the company promised “totally anonymous, device-to-device encrypted communications, brought to you by a globally trusted and recognized secure communications service.

The problem with that is that it was not brought to the companies customers by anything approaching a globally trusted and recognized secure communications service because it was hosted on Blackberry Enterprise Service servers.

Blackberry executive chairman and chief executive officer John Chen recently said “Today’s encryption has got to the point where it’s rather difficult, even for ourselves, to break it, to break our own encryption… it’s not an easily breakable thing. We will only attempt to do that if we have the right court order. The fact that we will honor the court order doesn’t imply we could actually get it done.

This Phantom Secure Android version included:

  1. Modified and Locked Down Device
  2. Secure Encrypted Device to Device Encrypted Messaging
  3. Anonymous Communication
  4. KNOX hardware and software integrated device security
  5. Prive Encrypted Chat
  6. Compatible messaging with BB7 Devices
  7. International Roaming
  8. 6 months Subscription Included

Worthless Disclaimers & Hollow Promises

Phantom Secure, and many like them, take care to make various disclaimers which they seem to think are a get out of jail freecard and state in their “Legal Compliance” section that:

We are a law-abiding company that is permitted to deliver encrypted communication services to our clients in order for them to protect their communications, without having the ability to decrypt their communications.”

The statement in no way ensures that these kind of suppliers cannot be indicted on charges. What it does do is give the impression to prospective customers that the company can in some way guarantee that even in the face of a warrant they do not possess the ability to compromise the historic or future communications of their customer base either intentionally or unintentionally.

But in the case of Blackberry that is just not true. It is public knowledge since 2016 that Operation Clemenza by the RCMP allowed Canadian investigators to access consumer-grade phones from Blackberry where the decryption key is in the company’s (RIM) possession.

BlackBerry, however, also offers the option to run their BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES) which allows clients to run their own network of phones, and keep possession of their own decryption key. And this is what Phantom Secure were doing but as far back as January 2016 Dutch police said that they were able to read encrypted messages sent on the custom, security-focused BlackBerry devices.

Also in December 2015 in the article “The Encryption Debate: a Way Forward,” on the official Blackberry blog INSIDE Blackberry the company wrote that “privacy and security form the crux of everything we do. However,our privacy commitmentdoes not extend to criminals.”

But isn’t criminality established after due process has taken place? Warrants do not prove criminality even if there is probable cause? Are RIM Blackberry qualified to make the distinctions?

Regardless they sold their BES products based on the claim that they would never be called upon to make the distinction because they had designed a product that was totally secure.

There are products which can guarantee this and even in the face of warrants are unable to provide logs, metadata, or encryption keys. But BES cannot. There lies one of the many significant problems that Mr. Ramos faces.

The disclaimer continues …

“Our service does not require personal information and has no back doors. In providing such a service we do understand that there will be a very small number of people that may use our service to do activities we do not support. We do not condone the use of our service for any type of illegal activities and if known we will terminate the use of our service without notice.”

“Considering this, requests for the contents of communications may arise from government agencies, which would require a valid search warrant from an agency with proper jurisdiction over Phantom Secure.”

“However, our response to such requests will be the content and identity of our clients are not stored on our server and that the content is encrypted data, which is indecipherable.”

“Our company was founded as a means to provide businesses and people the opportunity to communicate in private in this modern technological age. Unfortunately there will be people that will use this technology for acts we do not condone but this should not be the reason why our universal human right to privacy should be taken away.

Mr. Ramos & Explaining the Unexplainable

The very unlucky or very silly Mr. Ramos, depending on which way you look at it, has now been charged with racketeering activity involving gambling, money laundering, and drug trafficking. I hope Mr. Ramos enjoyed the spoils while he could because he is in a very tight spot now, one way or the other.

US authorities have argued that Phantom Secure operated explicitly to enable organised crime groups to evade detection while planning major crimes. Phantom allegedly built an international client base of criminals by taking BlackBerry devices, stripping out the camera, microphone, GPS navigation and other features, and installing encryption software, making them difficult for law enforcement to crack. He was arrested in California, amid claims that his firms products’ were allegedly linked to Australian murders and drug trafficking.” [This extract is from “Phantom Secure boss arrested in US, amid products’ suspected links to Australian murders” By Dan Oakes, ABC Australia, Monday 12th March 2018]

Think about that statement “Making them difficult for law enforcement to crack.”. Hmmmm. If Mr. Ramos makes bail I predict that one of the first questions that he will be asked by some of his more colourful customers is how exactly does that statement sit with the claims the company made on their website. At best he over-promised and under-delivered. [For posterity I have preserved the Phantom Secure website before it inevitably goes dark.]

These dog and bones went for between USD1500–USD2000 a piece with 6 months shelf life and Phantom Secure had 20k subscribers. Do the figures! If you lost one then you had to buy a new one, no discounts.

Isn’t it amazing that a market segment of normally paranoid individuals are willing to buy an expensive technology that they do not understand from a supplier that they do not know and then proceed to drop all normal “opsec”, if you could call it that, and openly plan the spectaculars that led to these arrests.

The Recent Upsurge in Success for “Intelligence Led” Operations

In the fullness of time it will be very interesting to see how the evidence to construct this indictment was acquired, what paper trail was left by the company showing their modus operandi, the promises versus the actual reality of what the company claimed it could deliver, and whether these claims as and of themselves are seen by the Courts as a marketing tool solely intended to appeal specifically to a certain base, namely those with criminal intentions, and how that can be proven.

The story also raises interesting questions on a topic that I have been researching now for some time – parallel construction. Over the last three years there has been a staggering increase in seizures of drug shipments and the foiling of multiple gangland assassinations attributed to “intelligence led” operations.

Since the late noughties Blackberry handsets have been the comms weapon of choice for organised crime even though they have been widely discredited. There is a school of thought that outfits such as Phantom Secure have been tolerated and let exist by law enforcement because they were such a rich source of warrantless intel.

But now that even the most clueless crims are moving away from the platform it seems that it has been decided that it is time to bring in all the “CEO’s” of these secure comms companies. Their usefulness has been exhausted.

Some of the coverage in recent days has claimed that Ramos is co-operating. My guess is that LE wish to use his arrest to turn him into a “co-operating witness” and as such provide them with what looks like legal access to the Phantom Secureservers.

In that way all of that juicy warrantless surveillance can be seen to have been legitimately obtained intelligence and the clientbase, big fish and small, can be hoovered up en-masse or turned into assets.

As for the stuff that has gone before — well, it didn’t become an issue at the trials so no need to revisit that. It was credited to HUMINT in the shape of informants who could not be named in order to protect their identity.

The Inevitability of Licensing

I have no particular insight into the innocence or guilt of Mr. Ramos in this case. I do not know whether he overtly solicited criminal clients in the full knowledge of their business and their need for secure comms in order to evade detection in a criminal enterprise.

What I do know is that if you are legally recorded saying:

“Hey man, I sell these phones that are bullet proof and can’t be hacked or eavesdropped (“even though that is not the case”) and I know you value your security and privacy because your foe is law enforcement and your trade is illegal and I can sell you these phones for $$$$’s and you can ply your trade without fear of discovery

….. then you are nicked mate.

Mr. Ramos is damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t. He is finished every which way he turns.

The movie Layer Cake has a rich seam of relevant content to illustrate my point. In that movie Colm Meaney explains to Daniel Craig’s character XXXX his Cornelian dilemma as a result of being present during an incident:

“Listen, son. Let me explain something to you. Freddie’s in intensive care with a bit of a brain haemorrhage. You were there at the scene. That’s called joint venture. Now, if Freddie dies, you’re either in the dock with Morty… …or you’re in the witness box putting him away. Think about that.

The outcome of this matter is likely to produce significant and wider repercussions for the providers of secure communications solutions in general.

This case and those to follow are a preparatory step for compulsory licensing for purveyors of private encryption systems. They offer an antidote to the privacy objections about backdoors and present a far more pragmatic solution to giving law enforcement access to encrypted communications than systems that are “thoughtfully design” as was recently and ridiculously suggested by FBI Director, Christopher Wray.

The provision of private secure comms solutions will evolve to the same standard of licensing as is applied to firearms sales. Such companies will be required to be licensed before offering the service and when selling licenses I guess that pre-qualification checks on the purchaser will be required too. Purchasing a license will probably be enough to claim “probable cause” under FISA rules in the US. It takes little enough justification to eavesdrop as it stands.

Undermining the Argument for Un-Compromised Encryption

The arguments in support of generally available un-compromised encryption services are devalued by the incorrect parallels that the opponents of encryption make between them and the Phantom Secure case.

It plays directly into the narrative that the host of encryption luddites in law enforcement, government, and the intelligence community peddle daily as they seek to justify back-dooring or banning encryption products.

Those who oppose encryption use illogical extrapolations when making their arguments — “the bad guy used encryption … therefore the crime was committed because of encryption”. They use the special case to undermine the general case.

The Phantom Secure case will be used as another example of why encryption is bad. But the Phantom Secure case is not about privacy or encryption rights or freedom of speech.

If there is even the slightest question that the provider of hardware, software, and any other “wares” knowingly supplies them for assisting the commission of an offence or even suspects that they will be used in one then it is aiding and abetting and all the other bits and pieces that have been included on Mr. Ramos’s much publicised indictment.

References and Bibliography

  1. https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/chief-executive-and-four-associates-indicted-conspiring-global-drug-traffickers
  2. https://motherboard.vice.com/amp/en_us/article/a34b7b/phantom-secure-sinaloa-drug-cartel-encrypted-blackberry?__twitter_impression=true
  3. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bme5w3/customer-data-from-encrypted-phone-company-ciphr-has-been-dumped-online
  4. http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43425333
  5. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mbpyea/encrochat-secure-phone-hacking-video
  6. https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/state-secrets-privilege
  7. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/the-rogues-gallery-of-encryption-luddites-graham-penrose
  8. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/peertalk-tm-privacy-vs-national-security-panel-questions-for-session-1-graham-penrose
  9. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/all-blackberry-messages-can-be-decrypted-using-global-encryption-key-valery-marchuk
  10. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/would-you-hire-a-locksmith-you-dont-trust
  11. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/boss-of-a-company-that-supplied-encrypted-phones-arrested-andrew-commons
  12. https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/09/dark-side/secret-origins-evidence-us-criminal-cases
  13. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/canadian-law-enforcement-obtained-blackberry-global-encryption-key-hega-geoffroy
  14. https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/android-blackberry-spyware-used-in-india-attacks-or-securityweek-com-hega-geoffroy
  15. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/01/13/police-say-they-can-crack-blackberry-pgp-encrypted-email/
  16. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/13/blackbery_pgp_riddle/
  17. https://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2441666/blackberry-pgp-handsets-cracked-by-dutch-cyber-cops
  18. https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/one-reason-get-blackberry-2016-security/
  19. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/04/26/police-seize-network-behind-encrypted-blackberry-pgp-devices/
  20. https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog/phone-evidence-remotely-wiped-in-police-stations/
  21. http://www.zdnet.com/article/police-hack-pgp-server-with-3-6-million-messages-from-organized-crime-blackberrys/
  22. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160118/07441433368/blackberry-which-said-it-wouldnt-protect-criminals-assures-criminals-phones-are-still-secure.shtml
  23. https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/are-encrypted-phones-allowing-criminals-to-get-away-with-murder-20150523-gh82gv.html
  24. http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/criminals-love-the-blackberry-s-wiretap-proof-ways-police-1.815031
  25. https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/crime/cops-struggling-crack-encrypted-phones-6962815
  26. https://www.thedailybeast.com/meet-danny-the-guy-selling-encrypted-phones-to-organized-crime
  27. https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2018/03/the-fbi-busts-phantom-secure-ceo-for-allegedly-selling-encrypted-phones-to-gangs-drug-cartels/
  28. https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/crime/cops-struggling-crack-encrypted-phones-6962815
  29. http://uk.businessinsider.com/methods-that-police-use-to-catch-deep-web-drug-dealers-2016-8?r=UK&IR=T
  30. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/30/metropolitan-police-mobile-phone-surveillance
  31. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38183819
  32. https://www.techrepublic.com/article/fbi-nabs-ceo-of-encrypted-phone-company-for-sales-to-cartels-gangs/
  33. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/nz7e3z/decrypted-pgp-blackberry-messages-helped-convict-uk-gun-smugglers
  34. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/03/fbi-again-calls-for-magical-solution-to-break-into-encrypted-phones/
  35. http://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1758/
  36. https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/phantom-secure-ceo-arrested/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

ENDS.

“A Song for the Deaf” (and the Blind)

Songs for the Deaf, released on August 27 2002, was the third studio album by Queens of the Stone Age. There is a track on there called “A Song for the Deaf” with a line in the lyrics:

No talk will cure what’s lost, or save what’s left

That line does just fine at summing up my attitude to the long term prospects for the privacy of our data and our privacy rights as individuals. The multiplicity of additional data points that will become available with the mainstream adoption of wearables, AR, and VR squares the circle by adding kinematic fingerprinting and emotion detection to the digital surveillance arsenal.

The concerted effort by “authority” to normalise the invasion of our privacy as citizens of democracies will succeed. It is worth noting at this point that the historic permission to look at our (non-US citizens) data is for the most part secretively mandated or just plain illegal.

In the interim I simply see it as my hobby to be a contrarian and frankly I do not give one iota what that looks like to prospective employers, clients, or colleagues. Too many people look at you sideways these days when you seek to insist that we are throwing away our rights in favour of some US manufactured bogey-man fear figure.

But despite the ever increasing powers granted there are far too many people gainfully employed in law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the cottage industries and corporates that serve them to hope that one day their combined efforts might actually result in an improvement in the threat landscape.

Narrowing the Debate

One of the methods often used to divert attention from the overall issues that present themselves with respect to mass surveillance is to seek to narrow the debate. Some people will say that debating each element in isolation is enough. It is not.

The police-intelcom barrier or rather the lack of a barrier between police organizations and intelligence organizations or the illegal overriding of such barriers is one of the reasons why. Too many blurred lines exist. Mass surveillance data acquired for national security purposes now routinely ends up in the hands of local law enforcement investigating matters unrelated to national security.

The opacity of US laws and SIGINT collection methods is potentially an abuse of the rights of every defendant that comes in front of their Courts. Increasingly, that is just about anybody that they can lay their hands on, from anywhere. The US position on most of these matters is ephemeral. [Max Schrems maintains the main protections provided by the US for data privacy rights of EU citizens have no statutory basis and “could be altered tomorrow”]

To suggest that one can compartmentalise each different element of the mass surveillance equation and debate each piece of legislation on its own merits, to the exclusion of the others, is a fallacy.

They all add up to the same thing in the hands of the governments or organisations that possess the resources, access, and “authority” (normally self granted) to mine the data.

This post was prompted by Chris Gebhardt‍ and the article he penned on Peerlyst‍ titled “The US Government Should Have Access to All Encrypted Devices of US Citizens“.

I commented “I utterly disagree with your thesis on every level. I disagree with you on the basis that I do not accept your segmentation of rights and protections in statute that govern legacy personal freedoms, due process, habeas corpus, et al. and the stratagem that you have employed to roll them up into an argument for weakened privacy (encryption). I believe that your reliance on these legacy instruments makes the flawed assumption that they were correct. In my view, they were not.

Chris was keen to keep the debate focussed on the US. So I asked:

Maybe we can circumvent the specifics of either geography and focus the discussion on a universal question which is capable of also addressing the specifics of your argument. The US does not respect digital borders and engages in frequent – and as policyillegal searches and seizures in a clandestine manner for non natsec matters and “ordinary” criminal matters. Now the US having weathered the outrage storm is legislating vigourously for the normalisation of these abnormalities which were in fact illegal under traditional law also.

The debate between us therefore could be something like – to date have existing laws and the application and oversight of the powers granted by those laws served us well and if so are they also suited for export to the digital domain. If not, then why should those who currently enjoy freedoms in the digital domain subject themselves to laws that they disagreed with in the real world context or were shown to have been widely abused, and more specifically how can a body of agencies who gladly engaged in widespread illegal activities expect people to surrender to their request?

Chris replied:

That is fine but I believe it is a separate post. Perhaps you should start one. I started this one to specifically target the US privacy issue under Constitutional authority. International expectations are a completely different matter.

So here it is.

Image: Screen grab from the QOTSA video “Go With The Flow

ENDS

Using Stylometry DHS have id’d Bitcoin creator Nakamoto with help from NSA PRISM & MUSCULAR programs

Allegedly using word surveillance and stylometry the effort took less than a month. Apparently using encryption and complex obfuscation methods is not a defence when the “seeker” has access to trillions of writing samples from a billion or so people across the globe.

By taking Satoshi’s texts and finding the 50 most common words, the NSA was able to break down his text into 5,000 word chunks and analyse each to find the frequency of those 50 words. This would result in a unique 50-number identifier for each chunk. The NSA then placed each of these numbers into a 50-dimensional space and flatten them into a plane using principal components analysis. The result is a ‘fingerprint’ for anything written by Satoshi that could easily be compared to any other writing.

It is worth noting that the original post is littered with comments that request more details on the source of the information that informed the post or some other such proof of the veracity of the claims being made but the author declared in response:

Many readers have asked that I provide third party citations to ‘prove’ the NSA identified Satoshi using stylometry. Unfortunately, I cannot as I haven’t read this anywhere else — hence the reason I wrote this post. I’m not trying to convince the reader of anything, instead my goal is to share the information I received and make the reader aware of the possibility that the NSA can easily determine the authorship of any email through the use of their various sources, methods, and resources.

Many readers have asked who Satoshi is and I’ve made it clear that information wasn’t shared with me. Based on my conversation I got the impression (never confirmed) that he might have been more than one person. This made me think that perhaps the Obama administration was right that Bitcoin was created by a state actor. One person commented on this post that Satoshi was actually four people. Again, I have no idea.

If it is true then “The moral of the story? You can’t hide on the internet anymore. Your sentence structure and word use is MORE unique than your own fingerprint. If an organization, like the NSA, wants to find you [sic] they will.

Full story by Alexander Muse is on Medium.

ENDS

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #18 – UCL / Raytheon

In November 2014, Raytheon announced its acquisition of Blackbird Technologies. This acquisition expanded Raytheon’s special operations capabilities in several areas including:

  • Tactical Intelligence
  • Surveillance and reconnaissance
  • Secure tactical communications
  • Cybersecurity

Raytheon stated that their existing capabilities were now augmented by the Blackbird Technologies acquisition “across a broad spectrum of globally dispersed platforms and communications networks”. Blackbird Technologies was synergistic with Raytheon’s existing expertise and capabilities specifically in the areas of:

  • Sensors
  • Communications
  • Command & Control

This document dump contains suggested PoC’s for malware attack vectors. Raytheon Blackbird Technologies acted as a “kind of “technology scout” for the Remote Development Branch (RDB) of the CIA”.

They analysed malware attacks in the public domain and then gave the CIA recommendations for malware projects. These suggestions by RBT to the CIA were in line with the agencies stated objectives. These malware recommendations benefitted from data derived from “test deployments” in the field by other malware actors. Weaknesses in legacy deployments were assessed and designed out in the CIA versions.

The 19th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

Today, July 19th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the CIA contractor Raytheon Blackbird Technologies for the “UMBRAGE Component Library” (UCL) project. The documents were submitted to the CIA between November 21st, 2014 (just two weeks after Raytheon acquired Blackbird Technologies to build a Cyber Powerhouse) and September 11th, 2015. They mostly contain Proof-of-Concept ideas and assessments for malware attack vectors – partly based on public documents from security researchers and private enterprises in the computer security field. Raytheon Blackbird Technologies acted as a kind of “technology scout” for the Remote Development Branch (RDB) of the CIA by analysing malware attacks in the wild and giving recommendations to the CIA development teams for further investigation and PoC development for their own malware projects.

Forty One (41) documents accompanied this release:

  1. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15083 — HTTPBrowser
  2. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15085 — NfLog
  3. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — Regin – Stealthy Surveillance
  4. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) FireEye — HammerToss – Stealthy Tactics
  5. 11 September, 2015 (S//NF) VB — Gamker
  6. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) SentinelOne – Rombertik
  7. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) FireEye – Window into Russian Cyber Ops
  8. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) MalwareBytes — HanJuan Drops New Tinba
  9. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) Cisco — Rombertik
  10. 4 September, 2015 (S//NF) RSA — Terracotta VPN
  11. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) Dell SecureWorks — Sakula
  12. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15078 — Skipper Implant
  13. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — Evolution of Ransomware
  14. 28 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15079 — Cozy Bear
  15. 28 August, 2015 (U) McAfee DLL Hijack — PoC Report
  16. 28 August, 2015 (U) HeapDestroy – DLL Rootkit — PoC Report
  17. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) TW — WildNeutron
  18. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) NMehta — Theories on Persistence
  19. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) CERT-EU — Kerberos Golden Ticket
  20. 21 August, 2015 (S//NF) VB Dridex 2015 — Dridex
  21. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — Black Vine
  22. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIR 15005 — Stalker Panda
  23. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) CSIT 15016 — Elirks RAT
  24. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) Eset — Liberpy
  25. 14 August, 2015 (S//NF) Eset — Potao
  26. 7 August, 2015 (U) Sinowal Web Form Scraping — PoC Report
  27. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) MIRcon — Something About WMI
  28. 7 August, 2015 (U) PoC Report — Anti-Debugging and Anti-Emulation
  29. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) SY 2015 — Butterfly Attackers
  30. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) Symantec — ZeroAccess Indepth
  31. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) CI 2015 — PlugX 7.0
  32. 7 August, 2015 (U) Mimikatz Password Scanning Analysis — PoC Report
  33. 7 August, 2015 (S//NF) TrendMicro — Understanding WMI Malware
  34. 4 August, 2015 (S//NF) CanSecWest 2013 — DEP/ASLR Bypass Without ROP/JIT
  35. 26 June, 2015 (U) Software Restriction Policy: A/V Disable — PoC Report
  36. 26 June, 2015 (U) WMI Persistence Proof of Concept — Supplemental Report
  37. 29 May, 2015 (U) Mimikatz PoC Report
  38. 29 May, 2015 (U) Pony / Fareit PoC Report
  39. 26 January, 2015 (U) SIRIUS Pique Proof-of-Concept Delivery — User-Mode DKOM — Final PoC Report
  40. 29 December, 2014 (U) SIRIUS Pique Proof-of-Concept Delivery — Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) — Interim PoC Report
  41. 21 November, 2014 (U) Direct Kernel Object Manipulasiton (DKOM) — Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Outline 21 November, 2014

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks CIA document dump synopses are available via the Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 Leaks

ENDS 

 

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #19 – Dumbo

Dumbo is a capability to suspend processes utilizing webcams and corrupt any video recordings that could compromise a PAG deployment. The PAG (Physical Access Group) is a special branch within the CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence); its task is to gain and exploit physical access to target computers in CIA field operations. *

Vault7 Projects - Images - AAC Dumbo - PAG

The 3rd August 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

Today, August 3rd 2017 WikiLeaks publishes documents from the Dumbo project of the CIA. Dumbo is a capability to suspend processes utilizing webcams and corrupt any video recordings that could compromise a PAG deployment. The PAG (Physical Access Group) is a special branch within the CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence); its task is to gain and exploit physical access to target computers in CIA field operations. Dumbo can identify, control and manipulate monitoring and detection systems on a target computer running the Microsoft Windows operating sytem. It identifies installed devices like webcams and microphones, either locally or connected by wireless (Bluetooth, WiFi) or wired networks. All processes related to the detected devices (usually recording, monitoring or detection of video/audio/network streams) are also identified and can be stopped by the operator. By deleting or manipulating recordings the operator is aided in creating fake or destroying actual evidence of the intrusion operation. Dumbo is run by the field agent directly from an USB stick; it requires administrator privileges to perform its task. It supports 32bit Windows XP, Windows Vista, and newer versions of Windows operating system. 64bit Windows XP, or Windows versions prior to XP are not supported.

Log Excerpt:

Vault7 Projects - Images - AAC Dumbo - LOG

Eight documents were also published alongside this release:

Dumbo v3.0 — Field Guide

Dumbo v3.0 — User Guide

Dumbo v2.0 — Field Guide

Dumbo v2.0 — User Guide

Dumbo v1.0 — TDR Briefing

Dumbo v1.0 — User Guide

Dumbo Epione v1.0 — TDR Briefing

Dumbo Epione v1.0 — User Guide

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks CIA document dump synopses are available via the Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault 7 Leaks

ENDS 

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #17 – Imperial: Achilles, SeaPea, & Aeris

These leaked documents relate to a CIA project codenamed ‘Imperial’, they include details of three CIA hacking tools and implants that have been designed to compromise computers running Apple Mac OS X and different Linux distributions. *

The three hacking tools are:

  1. Achilles – A tool to trojanize a legitimate OS X disk image (.dmg) installer;
  2. SeaPea – A Stealthy Rootkit For Mac OS X Systems;
  3. Aeris – An Automated Implant For Linux Systems.

The 27th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

Today, July 27th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the Imperial project of the CIA. Achilles is a capability that provides an operator the ability to trojan an OS X disk image (.dmg) installer with one or more desired operator specified executables for a one-time execution. Aeris is an automated implant written in C that supports a number of POSIX-based systems (Debian, RHEL, Solaris, FreeBSD, CentOS). It supports automated file exfiltration, configurable beacon interval and jitter, standalone and Collide-based HTTPS LP support and SMTP protocol support – all with TLS encrypted communications with mutual authentication. It is compatible with the NOD Cryptographic Specification and provides structured command and control that is similar to that used by several Windows implants. SeaPea is an OS X Rootkit that provides stealth and tool launching capabilities. It hides files/directories, socket connections and/or processes. It runs on Mac OSX 10.6 and 10.7.

Vault7 Projects - Images - HackRead Imperial

Three documents were also published alongside this release:

Achilles — User Guide

The malware has been tested to be compatible with Intel processors running 10.6 OS.

SeaPea — User Guide

This hack was written in 2011. It is listed as “tested” on OS X 10.6/Snow Leopard and Mac OS X 10.7/Lion. The malware works by assigning processes to any one of the three categories namely: Normal, Elite, and Super-Elite. ** The commands in SeaPea are executed as Elite processes.

Aeris — Users Guide

The coding for the Aeris hacking tool was done in C and it affects the following systems:

Debian Linux 7 (i386), Debian Linux 7 (amd64), Debian Linux 7 (ARM), Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (i386), Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (amd64), Solaris 11 (i386), Solaris 11 (SPARC), FreeBSD 8 (i386), FreeBSD 8 (amd64), CentOS 5.3 (i386) and CentOS 5.7 (i386). ***

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks dumps synopses are available on WikiLeaks and also see further analysis of Imperial at HackRead and The Hacker News.

ENDS

Header image courtesy of The Hacker News (Twitter @TheHackersNews) & in-article image courtesy of HackRead (Twitter @HackRead)

* Content courtesy of Pierluigi Paganini “Security Affairs” article  WikiLeaks published another batch of classified documents from the CIA Vault 7 leak, it includes details of the Imperial project

** References from content courtesy of HackRead – Twitter @HackRead

*** References from content courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews

Boiling Privacy Frogs

I really wish that I understood more about psychology and the human condition. The behaviour that puzzles me over and over again and for which I have no explanation is our ability to observe something happening that is detrimental to us in every way and yet do nothing.

It is the “Boiling Frog Phenomenon” which was allegedly a 19th century science experiment where a frog was placed in a pan of boiling water, the frog quickly jumped out. However, when the frog was put in cold water and the water slowly boiled over time, the frog did not perceive the danger and just boiled to death. The hypothesis being that the change in temperature was so gradual that the frog did not realize it was boiling to death.

To demonstrate the same effect in terms of the privacy, surveillance, unwarranted government intrusion debate just trace the evolving public attitude to the J. Edgar Hoover’s Subversive Files, COINTELPRO, The Iraq WMD Lie, Snowden & PRISM, and WikiLeaks Vault 7.

I have come to the conclusion that in relation to our right to privacy that we are all frogs in tepid water, the temperature of which is starting to rise rapidly, and we have no intention of jumping out.

ENDS