Category Archives: NSA

Focus on Kaspersky hides facts of another NSA contractor theft

The Wall Street Journal based their story on the fact that another NSA contractor took classified documents home with him. Yet another Russian intelligence operation stole copies of those documents. The twist this time is that the Russians identified the documents because the contractor had Kaspersky Labs anti-virus installed on his home computer.

This is either an example of the Russians subverting a perfectly reasonable security feature in Kaspersky’s products, or Kaspersky adding a plausible feature at the request of Russian intelligence. In the latter case, it’s a nicely deniable Russian information operation. In either case, it’s an impressive Russian information operation.

This is a huge deal, both for the NSA and Kaspersky. The Wall Street Journal article contains no evidence, only unnamed sources. But I am having trouble seeing how the already embattled Kaspersky Labs survives this.

What’s getting a lot less press is yet another NSA contractor stealing top-secret cyberattack software. What is it with the NSA’s inability to keep anything secret anymore?

And it seems that Israeli intelligence penetrated the Kaspersky network and noticed the operation.

Full story on CRYPTO-GRAM October 15, 2017 by Bruce Schneier CTO, IBM Resilient schneier@schneier.com https://www.schneier.com

END

Using Stylometry DHS have id’d Bitcoin creator Nakamoto with help from NSA PRISM & MUSCULAR programs

Allegedly using word surveillance and stylometry the effort took less than a month. Apparently using encryption and complex obfuscation methods is not a defence when the “seeker” has access to trillions of writing samples from a billion or so people across the globe.

By taking Satoshi’s texts and finding the 50 most common words, the NSA was able to break down his text into 5,000 word chunks and analyse each to find the frequency of those 50 words. This would result in a unique 50-number identifier for each chunk. The NSA then placed each of these numbers into a 50-dimensional space and flatten them into a plane using principal components analysis. The result is a ‘fingerprint’ for anything written by Satoshi that could easily be compared to any other writing.

It is worth noting that the original post is littered with comments that request more details on the source of the information that informed the post or some other such proof of the veracity of the claims being made but the author declared in response:

Many readers have asked that I provide third party citations to ‘prove’ the NSA identified Satoshi using stylometry. Unfortunately, I cannot as I haven’t read this anywhere else — hence the reason I wrote this post. I’m not trying to convince the reader of anything, instead my goal is to share the information I received and make the reader aware of the possibility that the NSA can easily determine the authorship of any email through the use of their various sources, methods, and resources.

Many readers have asked who Satoshi is and I’ve made it clear that information wasn’t shared with me. Based on my conversation I got the impression (never confirmed) that he might have been more than one person. This made me think that perhaps the Obama administration was right that Bitcoin was created by a state actor. One person commented on this post that Satoshi was actually four people. Again, I have no idea.

If it is true then “The moral of the story? You can’t hide on the internet anymore. Your sentence structure and word use is MORE unique than your own fingerprint. If an organization, like the NSA, wants to find you [sic] they will.

Full story by Alexander Muse is on Medium.

ENDS

In Chamberlain-esque Pose EU Declares “Privacy in our Time”

The notional purpose of the EU-US Privacy Shield is to establish a framework that allows personal data for commercial purposes to be transferred between the European Union and the United States.

Personal data that is received by US companies operating in Europe is ostensibly governed by EU privacy laws. Pick any notable US organization and they have an office in Europe, typically serving the EMEA region.

But for the purposes of this rant suffice to say that we need only consider Google, Apple, Microsoft, Twitter, and Facebook (a.k.a “Farcebook”).

Do not buy into the high profile privacy battles that these organizations now raise high as examples of their commitment to their customers’ privacy. These are PR tactics.

All of these organizations were more than happy to be secretly willing accomplices to US intelligence agency antics and law-breaking before their activities were exposed and they suffered a backlash. They have been vigourously back-pedalling and papering over the cracks ever since. It is all meaningless posturing.

They are inherently compromised, every day, and in every way.

The EU-US Privacy Shield replaces what was called the International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (ISHPP). Lofty names for a veneer that actually contains no verifiable substance or oversight when you examine the vast amount of exceptions and undermining laws that in fact render them all moot.

In late 2015 , the ISHPP was declared invalid in its entirety by the EU at a hearing in the European Court of Justice.

But like a smarmy salesperson, the US simply flicked the pages on the sales brochure asking “well, what about this?” – “no?” – “this?” – “no?” – “this?” – until some browbeaten Brussels technocrat bought the bullshit and agreed a new name for the same abuses.

In the usual garbled and meaningless language of the European Commission it was declared on 2nd February 2016 that the EU and the US had found new common ground on the privacy issue and an “Adequacy Decision” was published. (What exactly is an “Adequacy Decision” when it is at home eating chips and eavesdropping on its neighbours?)

In a Chamberlain-esque pose the EU held up this new agreement and declared that it was “…. equivalent to the protections offered by EU law.”

It is not.

ENDS

For more scholarly and considered thinking, read Joint letter to European Commission on EU-US Privacy Shield (July 26, 2017) from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to the European Commission to urge a re-evaluation of its Implementing Decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield on the basis that the United States of America (United States) does not ensure a level of fundamental rights protection regarding the processing of personal data that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union (EU).

Building A Global Nation State SMB Exploit Honeypot Infrastructure With A £50 Budget #EternalPot

Note to post: All words, IP ownership, analysis, opinions, data, graphs et al are the property of Kevin Beaumont and where altered and extracted are done so remaining true to the original meaning / assertions. From and article by “Kevin Beaumont InfoSec, from the trenches of reality. Email kevin.beaumont@gmail.com | Twitter: @gossithedog on Twitter” titled “EternalPot — Lessons from building a global Nation State SMB exploit honeypot infrastructure” athttps://doublepulsar.com/eternalpot-lessons-from-building-a-global-nation-state-smb-exploit-honeypot-infrastructure-3f2a0b064ffe

Worthy of note before beginning to read this beauty – Mr. Beaumont predicted that this would happen back in April 2017:

Now over to the expert ….

Extracts BEGIN (again full original article here

A week ago I started building #EternalPot, a honeypot for the Equation Group SMB exploits leaked by the Shadow Brokers last month.” (May 2017) – “My entire budget for one of this is £50, as I self fund all my InfoSec research — I work for a company that makes crab paste, so everything is done outside of work, on my own time. I highly recommend working InfoSec for a company where the CapEx tap is turned off temporarily, by the way, as you’ll find out how skilled your workforce are and you’ll get back to the most important part of InfoSec: the basics. Build simple solutions, always…..

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There has been a lot of vendor and press coverage of WannaCry which has been inaccurate. Despite what has been said, WannaCry was not spread via phishing or email — in fact, it was an SMB worm. Seeing a constant stream of misinformation from InfoSec vendors still around this has been depressing — it still continues to this day, long since the major players and initial victims walked back the email line…..

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The EternalPot data has shown advanced attacks, multiple coin miners, remote access trojans and lateral movement attempts into corporate networks — all via the Windows SMBv1 service. One of the exploits — EternalBlue — was used by the WannaCry ransomware spreader…..

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As you can see pre-WannaCry (refer to diagram in article and below), these SMB attacks were almost non-existent. It’s an SMB worm like the ones from the prior decade. Another angle to the press coverage was Windows XP being impacted — in fact, an entire weekend of UK mainstream media and political commentary ran about this. While SMBv1 has serious issues on Windows XP and 2003 (and on later OSes!) and should be patched and firewalled (aka disabled), the reality was the WannaCry spreader didn’t work on Windows XP SP3…..

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All the WannaCry samples seen so far — thousands delivered in real world honeypots — have two factors:

  1. They are one of two corrupt versions, where they spread but fail to execute ransomware as the PE headers are corrupt.
  2. They contain working killswitches.

If you’re pondering why WannaCry seemed to disappear almost completely, here we are. The authors simply disappeared. The Tor payment pages don’t even exist now. We owe MalwareTech more than pizza…..

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Another angle to the press coverage was Windows XP being impacted — in fact, an entire weekend of UK mainstream media and political commentary ran about this. While SMBv1 has serious issues on Windows XP and 2003 (and on later OSes!) and should be patched and firewalled (aka disabled), the reality was the WannaCry spreader didn’t work on Windows XP SP3. Here’s Kaspersky’s graph of infected operating systems…..

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One thing I will say — I don’t want to name the vendors, but some of the biggest next-generation security productssimply aren’t detecting SMB attacks nearly well enough. Malware regularly infects these systems, and they have to be reimaged as a result. It is amazing seeing next gen, premium tools with machine learning etc running Coin Miners andremote access trojans delivered via old exploits, with the tools not even noticing. It has been very eye opening for me. The marketing to reality Venn diagram here isn’t so Venn. At times it is so bad it is actually jaw dropping seeing certain attacks not being detected…..

Extracts END (again full original article here

ENDS

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #15 – BothanSpy & Gyrfalcon

BothanSpy is Microsoft Windows implant that targets the SSH client program Xshell and steals user credentials for all active SSH sessions. Gyrfalcon is a CentOS, Debian, RHEL, SUSE, and Ubuntu Linux Platform implant that targets the OpenSSH client not only steals user credentials of active SSH sessions but is also capable of collecting full or partial OpenSSH session traffic. Both implants save the collected information in an encrypted file for later exfiltration while the BothanSpy implant also implements exfiltration in real time to a CIA server thus leaving no footprint on the target system storage disk(s).

The 6th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

“Today, July 6th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the BothanSpy and Gyrfalcon projects of the CIA. The implants described in both projects are designed to intercept and exfiltrate SSH credentials but work on different operating systems with different attack vectors. BothanSpy is an implant that targets the SSH client program Xshell on the Microsoft Windows platform and steals user credentials for all active SSH sessions. These credentials are either username and password in case of password-authenticated SSH sessions or username, filename of private SSH key and key password if public key authentication is used. BothanSpy can exfiltrate the stolen credentials to a CIA-controlled server (so the implant never touches the disk on the target system) or save it in an enrypted [sic] file for later exfiltration by other means. BothanSpy is installed as a Shellterm 3.x extension on the target machine. Gyrfalcon is an implant that targets the OpenSSH client on Linux platforms (centos,debian,rhel,suse,ubuntu). The implant can not only steal user credentials of active SSH sessions, but is also capable of collecting full or partial OpenSSH session traffic. All collected information is stored in an encrypted file for later exfiltration. It is installed and configured by using a CIA-developed root kit (JQC/KitV) on the target machine.

Three documents were also published alongside this release BothanSpy V1.0 Tool Documentation, Gyrfalcon V2.0 User’s Guide, and Gyrfalcon 1.0 User Manual.

Previous and subsequent Vault 7 WikiLeaks dumps #1 – #14 and #16 synopses are available on WikiLeaks and analysis of BothanSpy & Gyrfalcon at The Hacker News.

ENDS

Edited Image courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews – Original Image edited to add extract from BothanSpy Tool Documentation Page 8 Screenshot 07/16/2017.

Quick Reference Resource: WikiLeaks CIA Vault7 Leak #16 – HighRise

HighRise is an android (V4.0 to V4.3) implant for SMS redirect to listening posts.

The 13th July 2017 WikiLeaks release overview:

“Today, July 13th 2017, WikiLeaks publishes documents from the HighRise project of the CIA. HighRise is an Android application designed for mobile devices running Android 4.0 to 4.3. It provides a redirector function for SMS messaging that could be used by a number of IOC tools that use SMS messages for communication between implants and listening posts. HighRise acts as a SMS proxy that provides greater separation between devices in the field (“targets”) and the listening post (LP) by proxying “incoming” and “outgoing” SMS messages to an internet LP. HighRise provides a communications channel between the HighRise field operator and the LP with a TLS/SSL secured internet communication.”

A HighRise User’s Guide was also published.

Previous Vault 7 WikiLeaks dumps #1 – #15 synopses are available on WikiLeaks and analysis of HighRise at The Hacker News.

ENDS

Image courtesy of The Hacker News – Twitter @TheHackersNews

Related Posts: #WikiLeaks #Vault7 Leak #16: #HighRise, #android implant for #SMS redirect #LP @TheHackersNews

https://airgapanonymitycollective.com/2017/07/15/wikileaks-cia-vault7-leak-16-highrise/

NSA Technology Transfer Program

The NSA Technology Transfer Program (TTP) transfers NSA-developed technology to industry, academia, and other research organisations.

The program, is located within the Research Directorate, and is operated under a federal mandate. Through this program the agency is tasked with moving technologies out of the NSA lab and seeking commercialisation opportunities.

The thinking behind this NSA / Private Sector co-operation according to the agencies website is:

  1. Successful transfer and commercialisation of NSA technologies gives traction to the federal government’s annual commitment to research and development, now totalling over $145 billion;
  2. Accelerates NSA mission solutions;
  3. Creates new companies, new jobs, and new revenue; and
  4. Strengthens the economy, which in turn, strengthens national security.

The NSA publishes the patent portfolio annually listing all of the agency developed technologies that are available for licensing. If you spot something that is of interest to your firm then there is an eight step process of engaging with the agency and there are five possible deal structures.

These deal structures are broadly categorised as:

  1. Patent License Agreement (PLA) – Enables businesses and entrepreneurs to commercialise NSA technology;
  2. Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) – Allows NSA to partner with companies, academia, non-profits, and state and local governments;
  3. Education Partnership Agreement (EPA) – Establishes the foundation of partnerships between NSA and educational institutions;
  4. Open Source Software (OSS) Releases – Gives NSA innovators the ability to share technology with the public;
  5. Technology Transfer Sharing Agreement (TTSA) – Enables other government agencies to access NSA-developed technologies.

ENDS